Wilson contends that the federal government has focused mostly on passenger security and has failed to pay enough attention to cargo. She cites the example of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), which has spent nearly $11 billion on aviation security since the terrorist attacks of 2001. "In addressing the passenger airlines' security needs, the TSA virtually ignored the rest of the transportation system," she writes.

But terrorists could smuggle bombs or other weapons of mass destruction inside ocean or air containers, and the costs of a supply chain disruption, particularly at a seaport, could have enormous economic consequences. If a labor action at West Cost ports in 2002 cost the country about $1 billion per day in lost commerce, Wilson asks, wouldn't a terrorist attack have the same or a higher price tag?

Although the government has initiated a number of programs to address port and container security, Wilson questions their worth and effectiveness. For example, she asserts that results are "mixed" for the Container Security Initiative (CSI). That program attempts to pre-screen containers before their arrival on U.S. shores by using technology, information, and the posting of Customs and Border Protection (CBP) inspectors at foreign ports.

Wilson points out that a recent study by the Government Accounting Office (GAO) found that 35 percent of U.S.-bound shipments from ports in the CSI program were not subject to inspection overseas. Furthermore, 28 percent of containers referred to host governments for scrutiny were not checked for various reasons. The GAO also pointed out that no minimum standards have been set for the non-intrusive inspection equipment used at CSI ports, resulting in varying capabilities in each locale. Finally, the government's watchdog agency said, "There is not a uniform standard or process for determining the risk level that should be assigned to a container."

The C-TPAT program also comes in for harsh criticism. Shippers taking part in C-TPAT must demonstrate compliance with security standards; in return, their shipments are supposed to receive expedited handling by Customs. But because C-TPAT is a voluntary partnership between Customs and the trade community, it's "by definition unenforceable," in Wilson's view.

She notes that the GAO found that Customs so far has validated the security programs of just 11 percent of C-TPAT members, although its original goal was to conduct validations of all members within 3 years. Because CBP has no written guidelines indicating what scope of effort is adequate for the validation process, the GAO found that C-TPAT is neither rigorous nor consistent. "Essentially, the cargoes of C-TPAT members are inspected less frequently because they gave their word their supply chains were safe," Wilson suggests. "This seems to me that it would actually increase our vulnerability, since more cargo would be deemed safe without inspection."

Despite security shortcomings, Wilson sees indications that the White House and Capitol Hill are elevating transportation security to a national priority. She notes that the Transportation Security Improvement Act of 2005, now before Congress, would provide $454 million for improvements in land and maritime protections.

Wilson urges federal lawmakers to take swift action to fill the chinks in the nation's security armor. "Reducing the vulnerability of our supply chain should be a number one priority for the federal agencies tasked with protecting our nation's infrastructure and livelihood," she says. "The industry should continue to work together to ensure that the risks in our logistics supply chain are reduced significantly."